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When Isa State Post-Conviction
Application "Properly Filed" Within
the Meaning of the AEDPA?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 23-26. © 2000 American Bar Association.

Jay E. Grenig is professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisc.;
jgrenig@earthlink.net or
(414) 288-5377. He is a co-author
of West's FederalJury Practice
and Instructions.

ISSUE
Can a state post-conviction application be "properly filed" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) if
it were procedurally barred from
review under state law?
FACTS
Early in the morning of Feb. 1,
1983, two New York City police officers observed a parked blue
Chevrolet occupied by four AfricanAmerican men. Before making contact with the car or the men in it,
the officers responded to another
call. When the officers returned to
the car, they observed that one of
its occupants had left the vehicle.
The officers then pulled up behind
the car as it let a second passenger
out. When the officers turned on
their red lights, the Chevrolet sped
away with two of the occupants.
The officers pursued the car, believing it was connected with several
robberies. Shots were exchanged,
but no one was injured. The officers
cornered the car behind a school,
and its two remaining occupants
fled. Twenty-two days later, Tony
Bruce Bennett and his co-defendant

were arrested and charged with
offenses relating to the chase.
The prosecution's case rested
entirely on the identification testimony of the two officers, both of
whom testified that they picked
Bennett out of a lineup on Feb. 23,
1983. The prosecution did not offer
any physical evidence against
Bennett. At trial, an officer who
assisted in the investigation testified
that both officers told him two days
after the incident that they were
uncertain whether they could identify who was in the car.
Julian Ishmael testified that Bennett
was with him at the time of the incident. He stated that he and Bennett
were about to leave Ishmael's home
when they heard shots and saw
flashing lights.
Following a 1984 jury trial, Bennett
was convicted of two counts of
attempted murder in the first
(Continued on Page 24)
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degree, criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of stolen property in
the first degree, and unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle. Evidence
introduced at trial indicated that
Bennett had fired two shots at a
police car during the car chase.
The Appellate Division, Second
Department, of the New York
Supreme Court affirmed Bennett's
conviction. People v. Bennett, 128
A.D.2d 540, 512 N.YS.2d 472
(1987).
Bennett's 1991 motion to vacate his
conviction on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence and ineffective
assistance of counsel was denied in
state court. In June 1995, Bennett
again moved to vacate his conviction. The 1995 motion asserted that
the trial court had denied him the
right to be present at the Sandoval
hearing and at other critical stages
of the trial and to offer certain testimony at trial. (In New York, a
"Sandovalhearing" is a pretrial
proceeding in which a court makes
an advance ruling as to whether the
prosecutor can use prior convictions
or proof of the prior commission of
specific criminal, vicious, or
immoral acts for the purpose of
impeaching a defendant's credibility.
People v. Sandoval, 314 N.E.2d 413
(N.Y 1974).)

order despite having written numerous letters to the state court
requesting information and a written copy of its disposition.
On Feb. 11, 1998, Bennett filed a
petition for habeas corpus in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York. In his petition,
Bennett alleged that he had been
denied his constitutional rights to
present witnesses in his defense and
to a fair trial, to be present at all
material stages of the trial, and to
the effective assistance of counsel.
The district court dismissed the
petition on the ground that it was
not timely filed because it had been
filed more than 21 months after the
enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).

The prosecution responded that all
of Bennett's claims were subject to a
mandatory procedural bar. It
explained that under New York law,
a court cannot hear either a claim
that was previously raised on appeal
and decided adversely to the defendant or a claim that could have
been raised on direct appeal but was
not.

At the time the district court dismissed Bennett's petition, his representations concerning his 1995
motion to vacate were not before it.
That information only came to light
later, when Bennett moved the district court for a Certificate of
Appealability (COA). Under the
AEDPA, an appellate case is "commenced" for purposes of determining its appealability under the
AEDPA when an application for a
certificate of appealability is filed.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). A COA should
issue if the petitioner shows that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack
v. McDaniel, 120 S.Ct. 1595 (2000).
(See ABA PREVIEW 212 (March 8,
2000).)

The court denied Bennett's motion
without elaboration in a Nov. 30,
1995, oral decision. Bennett claims
that he never received a copy of this

On review in the Second Circuit,
the court held that the AEDPA's
one-year limitations period on filing
habeas corpus petitions did not

apply in this case because Bennett's
conviction had become final before
the AEDPA's enactment. The court
noted that it had previously held
that prisoners whose habeas claims
accrued before the AEDPA's enactment are afforded the "reasonable
time" of "one year after the effective
date of the AEDPA to file a federal
habeas petition." See Ross v. Artuz,
150 F.3d 97, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1998)
(decided after the district court's
decision in this proceeding).
The Second Circuit then held that
the "tolling provision" of Section
2244(d)(2) applied to Bennett's case
and tolled all of the time from the
enactment of the AEDPA to the filing of his petition. The court determined that this tolling provision
applied to the grace period that it
had given state prisoners to file
their petitions under Ross. It ruled
that the 1995 motion had remained
"pending" until Bennett filed his
habeas petition because the state
had never provided Bennett with a
copy of the court's written decision,
and thus the state court's review of
his motion had never been completed. The court reasoned that the
state's failure to serve Bennett with
a copy of the order denying his
1995 motion had prevented him
from applying for a certificate for
leave to appeal. The court commented that Bennett did not bear
the burden of persuading the New
York courts to act expeditiously to
avoid a time bar claim that was
raised by the state itself. Concluding
that Bennett's 1995 motion had
been "properly filed" within the
meaning of the tolling provision
because the time for appealing the
New York court's denial of the 1995
motion has not yet expired and the
one-year grace period under Ross
had not yet commenced, the
Second Circuit reversed the
district court and returned the matter to the lower court for further
proceedings.

Issue No. 1

rhe Supreme Court agreed to
review the Second Circuit's decision
to apply the "tolling provision" of
Section 2244(d)(2) to a state court
application that was procedurally
barred and could not be heard on
the merits. 120 S.Ct. 1669 (2000).
CASE ANALYSIS
The writ of habeas corpus provides
a means by which the legal authority under which a person is detained
can be challenged. A writ of habeas
corpus may be used to reexamine
federal constitutional issues even
after trial and review by the state
courts. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.

443 (1953). By means of a writ of
habeas corpus, a federal court may
order the discharge of any person
held by a state in violation of the
federal Constitution or laws. 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The writ is
addressed to the person having custody of the prisoner-in this case
Christopher Artuz, superintendent
of the Greenhaven Correctional
Facility in New York.
In 1996, Congress made a number
of important changes to the federal
habeas corpus statutes as part of the
AEDPA, including the addition of a
one-year statute of limitations for
state prisoner filings. Congress also
provided a tolling provision intended to allow state prisoners to
exhaust state remedies without having that time count against them
before coming to federal court.
Before the enactment of the AEDPA,
there was no formal time limit for
filing a petition for habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A delayed
filing of a petition was a basis for
dismissal only if the appellant knew
or could have known the grounds
for the petition earlier and if the
state could demonstrate that the
delay prejudiced its ability to
respond to the petition. The AEDPA
changed this by imposing a one-year
limitations period on habeas peti-

tions that begins to run from the
latest of several events, including
the date on which the challenged
state judgment becomes final. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
However, the time during which a
"properly filed" application for state
post-conviction or other collateral
review is pending is not counted
toward any period of limitation
under Section 2244(d)(2). By not
counting the time during which a
petition is pending in state court,
the tolling provision preserves the
long-standing federal policy of
requiring habeas appellants to
exhaust state court remedies before
initiating suit in federal court.
In this case, Artuz argues that the
Second Circuit's interpretation of
"properly filed" eviscerates the
statute of limitations by allowing
state prisoners to extend the limitations period indefinitely, regardless
of whether the state court could
possibly hear the merits of the
claim. He asserts that the Second
Circuit's interpretation extends the
tolling provision far beyond its
intended scope, significantly undermines state procedural rules, and
would allow state prisoners to
obtain the benefit of tolling for
entirely repetitive, procedurally
barred applications in state court
that serve no purpose other than
delay.
Bennett, on the other hand, contends that the plain language of
Section 2244(d) permits tolling of
the limitations period during the
pendency of any state application
satisfying the prerequisites that
must be met before a state court
will allow the application to be filed.
Because Bennett's 1995 state
motion satisfied New York's filing
requirements, he argues that it was
and remains a "properly filed
motion" for state post-conviction
review.

Artuz suggests that by filing such
motions, a state prisoner could
extend the statute of limitations at
will by the simple expedient of filing
motion after motion, even if all the
prisoner's claims have already been
raised and decided adversely to the
prisoner. According to Artuz, under
the Second Circuit's interpretation,
a prisoner need only refile an old,
procedurally barred motion in order
to generate delay. Because Bennett's
1995 state post-judgment application was procedurally barred under
state law, Artuz says it was not
"properly filed" and did not toll the
statute of limitations.
Bennett responds that the availability of tolling under Section
2244(d)(2) does not depend on the
procedural default status of the individual claims presented in a prisoner's application for post-conviction
relief. According to Artuz, however,
an interpretation that denies tolling
for post-conviction applications that
are procedurally barred under state
law would curb unnecessary delays,
amply allow for exhaustion of state
remedies, and show respect for state
procedural rules in a manner that
promotes comity and federalism. He
contends that the objections to this
interpretation are insubstantial and
do not outweigh its benefits. He says
that his interpretation would neither involve the federal courts in an
inappropriate and burdensome
examination of state procedural
rules nor be too harsh on petitioners. Moreover, he says, well-established doctrines of habeas jurisprudence, most notably the exhaustion
doctrine, already require an examination of and respect for state procedural rules.
Bennett counters that defining a
"properly filed application" as an
application raising claims that are
not "mandatorily procedurally
barred" would afford prisoners no
(Continued on Page 26)
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meaningful guidance as to the types
of claims that will result in tolling
under Section 2244(d)(2).

SIGNIFICANCE
In addition to the Second Circuit,
several other courts (including the
First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh) have held that
the tolling provision of Section
2244(d) applies to petitions challenging pre-AEDPA convictions.
However, the Ninth Circuit has
reached a different conclusion,
holding that, when a claim cannot
be heard on the merits because it is
barred by a state procedural rule, it
is not "properly filed." In Dictado v.
Durchame, 189 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.
1999), the Ninth Circuit held that a
state petition that did not comply
with the state of Washington's filing
rules was not properly filed. The
court explained that a "properly
filed application" means an application submitted in compliance with
the procedural laws of the state in
which the application was filed.
The Fifth Circuit has held that it
would deny tolling for applications
that are untimely, but that it would
grant tolling if the state's time bar
contained any exception at all. In
Smith v. Ward, 209 F.2d 383 (5th
Cir. 2000), the court said that for
Section 2244(d)(2) purposes, a state
habeas application is "properly
filed" when it conforms with a
state's applicable procedural filing
requirements. ("Procedural filing
requirements" refers to the prerequisites that must be satisfied before
a state court will allow a petition to
be filed and given judicial review.)

Other courts have declined to allow
tolling for any application that a
state court has held was procedurally defective. In Freeman v. Page,
208 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2000), the
Seventh Circuit stated that the
question of whether a state collateral attack is "properly filed" so as to
toll the limitations period for filing a
federal habeas petition is determined by looking at how the state
courts treated the claim. If the state
courts considered the claim on the
merits, then it will be deemed to
have been properly filed. If, on the
other hand, they dismissed the
claim for procedural flaws such as
untimeliness, then the claim was
not properly filed-that the petitioner may have offered a "colorable
argument" for his position under
state law is not enough to make it
"properly filed."

ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Christopher Artuz (John M.
Castellano (718) 286-5801)
For Tony Bruce Bennett (Alan S.
Futerfas (212) 684-8400)

AMICUS BRIEFS (AS OF
SEPT. 1)
In Support of Christopher Artuz
Florida, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia
(Denise 0. Simpson (904)
238-9990)

Similarly, in Weekley v. Moore, 204
F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 2000), a divided panel found that a petitioner's
state post-conviction application
was not "properly filed" because it
was "successive" and thus did not
toll Section 2244(d)(2).
The Supreme Court is now given
the opportunity to resolve this disagreement among the circuits. A
decision upholding the Second
Circuit will make it more difficult
for prisoners to obtain post-conviction review by means of a habeas
petition in federal court. A decision
reversing the Second Circuit will
increase the availability of post-conviction review through habeas proceedings in federal court. It will be
interesting to see what significance
the Supreme Court attaches to the
alleged failure of the state court to
provide Bennett with written notice
of its decision in the case.

Issue No. 1

